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: Admiral Kingsmill and the Early Years of the Royal Canadian Navy Part III

Admiral Kingsmill and the Early
Years of the Royal Canadian Navy
Part III
Roger Sarty
Following is the fourth document in a series assembled to support the creation of a plaque in honour of
Admiral Kingsmill by the Ontario Heritage Trust. The plaque is located at his burial place, Emmanuel
Anglican Church Cemetery, Portland, Ontario, near the location of Kingsmill’s summer home on Grindstone
Island, and was unveiled in a ceremony on 15 May 2010. Part I of this series appears in Vol.19 no.1 (Winter
2010), pp.75-80 and part II in Vol.19 no.2 (Spring 2010), pp.76-80.

Document 4

Admiral Kingsmill’s review of the U-boat threat and the
development of anti-submarine defence measures on
Canada’s east coast in 1916 to 1917
Kingsmill to Secretary of the Admiralty, 22 November 1917 (Library and Archives Canada, Record Group
24, Volume 3831, file NS 1017-10-1 part 1).
Editor’s note: Here is Kingsmill’s blow by blow account of the development of the Canadian navy’s east coast anti-submarine flotilla
in the critical year from November 1916 to November 1917. During that period the u-boat threat to Canadian waters became much
more pressing in the wake of U-53’s pioneering transatlantic mission of October 1916 in which she destroyed five Allied merchant
vessels off the coast of New England. The memorandum begins with the British Admiralty’s advice in November 1916 that Canada
should triple the strength of its coastal patrol of 12 small steamers. Yet, as Kingsmill explains, Canada had no resources; neither did
Britain, which soon faced a renewed U-boat offensive off the west cost of the British Isles. The memorandum records the resulting
tensions between the Canadian and British naval authorities, and the measures they managed to concert, primarily by resorting
to construction of anti-submarine craft in Canadian shipyards.
The efforts described in the memorandum laid the groundwork for the rapid expansion of the Canadian anti-submarine flotilla,
largely with the Canadian-built craft, to a force of some 130 vessels crewed by 5,000 personnel in 1918. The British answers to the
pointed questions Kingsmill poses in the last part of the document about the level of the threat to Canada and the specific defences
required – British signals intelligence indicated a strong possibility that large u-boats would come to North American waters as
early as the spring of 1918 – triggered the all out push for expansion. As it happened, the expanded force deployed barely in time
to strengthen merchant ship convoy defences against three large u-boats that hunted in Canadian waters in August and September
1918.
The memorandum is a good example of Kingsmill’s plain speaking with British naval authorities in defence of Canadian
interests and those of the new Canadian navy despite his 39-year career in the British service.

© Canadian
Military
History,
Volume
19, Number 4, Autumn 2010, pp.75-80.
Published
by Scholars
Commons
@ Laurier,
2010

Kingsmill doc RCN patrols.indd 1

75

1

1/24/2011 12:43:48 PM

Canadian Military History, Vol. 19 [2010], Iss. 4, Art. 9
Secret.
From Director of Naval Service of Canada.
To Secretary of the Admiralty, London,
S.W.I.
- 22nd November, 1917.
It is requested that the following may
be laid before the Lords Commissioners
of the Admiralty for their consideration.
It is desired to point out that the
Naval Policy of Canada has never been
clearly defined, nor has the Imperial
Government ever clearly advised the
Dominion Government as to what the
Admiralty expected of the Department
of the Naval Service of Canada in the
way of offensive or defensive measures.
The Department, therefore, desire to lay
before Their Lordships the situation as it
now is, and to draw attention to several
points that are not clearly defined as
regards expansion, and on which advice
is asked:In November, 1916, a telegram was
received from the Secretary of State
for the Colonies, dated 11th November,
advising that the patrol of Newfoundland

and the Canadian Coasts was considered
inadequate, and suggesting that the force
should be increased to thirty-six vessels,
and at the same time offering to send an
officer to assist in the organization of such
patrol, and in procuring the necessary
vessels, etc., etc. This telegram was no
doubt sent after the despatch of a letter,
M.09462/16, dated 7th November, 1916,
from the Secretary of the Admiralty to the
Governor of Newfoundland, and which is
a reply to his letter of the 25th October,
No.47344.
To the telegram of the 11th November,
the Canadian Government replied in the
following terms on the 18th November:“Canadian Government notes that
Admiralty consider that present
twelve vessels are insufficient means
against serious attack on trade
on these waters and that thirty-six
vessels are considered necessary.
“It is desired to point out, however,
that in accordance with wishes of
Admiralty every possible trained
seaman has been sent over to
England, whilst active recruiting is

now being carried on for men to serve
overseas in the Royal Navy. Further,
when Canadian Government was
disposed to build destroyers early
this year Admiralty did not encourage
idea.
“Representative of War Office has
recently been allowed to purchase
or charter in Canada a number of
vessels which might have been
useful for patrol work, although
number of such in Canada is strictly
limited.
“As danger to Admiralty Store
transports and Canadian trade in
near future from enemy submarines
appears to be growing serious,
Canadian Government considers
adequate protection should be
accorded by Admiralty.”
and on December 28th, 1916, the
following was sent:“Secret. My advisers desire to
call attention to the telegram from
Admiralty through Colonial Secretary

Top: U-53 photographed during its visit
to Newport, Rhode Island on 7 October
1916. The United States was still
neutral and the visit was intended to
impress the Americans with the power
and transatlantic reach of the German
submarine fleet. The next day the u-boat
captured and sank five merchantmen,
three British, one Norwegian and one
Dutch. US destroyers were present but
because of American neutrality were
unable to do anything but rescue the
crews and passengers of the ships.
Bottom: U-155 (the ex-Deutschland,
a mercantile type submarine that
had been heavily armed with 15 cm
guns, torpedoes and mines) operated
off Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and
the northeastern US from August to
October 1918. She laid 14 mines in the
southern approaches to Halifax on 1718 September, which did no damage.
Several broke loose (and were thus
automatically rendered ‘safe’) and were
recovered by Canadian fishermen who
each received a $25 reward from the
Canadian navy.
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Dazzle-painted merchantmen put to sea
in convoy from Halifax in 1917 or 1918.
of 11th November last and to their
reply to Colonial Secretary of 18th
November as well as their further
cables of 7th and 15th December to
none of which any reply has been
received. In May last Minister of
Naval Service suggested to Admiralty
advisability of his Department
constructing three torpedo boat
destroyers at Canadian Vickers yards
but Admiralty’s reply was regarded
as discouraging the proposal. In
early months of the war my advisers
requested advice from Admiralty as
to advisability of Canada undertaking
to supplement naval defence of
Empire and reply received indicated
Admiralty view that such action was
unnecessary and that Canada’s
efforts should be concentrated on
provision of military forces. Under
these circumstances the Admiralty’s
intimation that we must provide
against danger of submarines on
our coast is very serious especially
as many boats suitable for patrol
work were acquired by War Office
in Canada in September last and
the recruiting for overseas forces in
Canada has denuded this country of
most suitable men for such purpose,
and every available gun has been
sent to the British Government.
My advisers would be grateful for
immediate reply to unanswered
telegrams above mentioned
and for a precise statement of
the Admiralty’s ability to provide
against danger of submarines on our
coast. If responsibility for protection
of our coast against submarines
must be undertaken by Canadian
Government immediate action
is imperative and it is absolutely
essential that the officer asked for in
despatch of 15th December should
be sent immediately.”

Department of National Defence (DND) photo CN-6903

: Admiral Kingsmill and the Early Years of the Royal Canadian Navy Part III

to which, on the 10th January 1917, the
following reply was received:-
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“Your telegram 29th December. It is
recognized by Admiralty that situation
is one of considerable difficulty for
your Ministers but they greatly regret
that dearth of small craft at home
makes it impossible to provide any
patrol vessels from United Kingdom
for service in Canadian waters.
Need for such craft however is very
urgent and although it is desirable
to build some at once it is still more
necessary to make use of any which
are or could be made available
immediately. Patrols in home waters
are composed mainly of trawlers low
speed and general type of vessel
required is one of good sea-going
qualities capable of carrying twelvepounder quick-firing gun and wireless
telegraph installation smaller guns
being unsuitable. It is suggested by
Admiralty that your Ministers should
consider whether suitable vessels
of similar type could be obtained
from whalers and sea-going fishing
vessels with auxiliary motive power.
Officer with practical experience
of auxiliary patrol at home will be
sent to Canada immediately and will
render all possible assistance to your
Ministers in organization of service
generally. Will reply as soon as
possible as regards proposal to take
over ships being built for Norwegian
owners.”
In reply to this, on the 16th January
1917, the Dominion Government sent
the following:“With reference to your telegram
10th January and 11th November

every effort is being made to secure
either by purchase or building the
vessels suggested in latter. Naval
Department has no reserve of trained
seamen or guns as all spare guns
have been transferred to England.
Can Admiralty provide requisite
number of guns and sufficient trained
men for each with instructional petty
officers and armourer ratings Stop
RAINBOW is approaching time when
extensive refit absolutely necessary,
if she were paid off number of
trained men would be available and
four 12-pdr. guns, also six 4.7 guns
would be liberated for defence of
merchantmen.”
and on the 27th January a further
telegram from the Prime Minister to Sir
Edward Carson, marked secret, was sent,
stating what we were doing to get the
thirty-six vessels suggested, and pointing
out our poverty as regards guns, and
asking the First Lord’s personal interest,
as the responsibilities placed upon the
Canadian Government in this respect
were quite unexpected, having reference
to previous advice given that danger was
potential, etc. In reply, a telegram dated
30th January was received, stating the
arrangements that would be made as to
supply of guns.
On the 5th February 1917, a telegram
was received as follows:“5th February. Shipbuilding. With
reference to your telegram 8th
December view of Admiralty is
that Canadian resources should
immediately be utilized for output of
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Anti-submarine trawlers fitting out at either Montreal or Quebec City in 1917, or more likely, 1918.
patrol boats that is steel vessels of
trawler type with as good speed as
can be obtained on the dimensions
and wooden steam drifters say thirtysix of the former and one hundred
of the latter. Admiralty would be
glad if Canadian Government could
undertake this programme and if
so could state as early as possible
by what date vessels could be
constructed. These vessels are
additional not only to the thirteen
already in commission but also to
the twenty-two others for the building
or purchase of which your Ministers
are understood to be arranging.
Designs are being prepared of
vessels considered most suitable
and will be sent for the guidance
of your Ministers if they decide to
undertake work. It is understood that
information in Canada as to designs
and costs of drifters which might be
built has already been collected by
the Imperial Munitions Board.”
and replied to in the following terms on
the 8th February 1917:“Your cable fifth respecting ship
building. My advisors are prepared
to undertake proposed programme
for His Majesty’s Government and
will proceed immediately with orders
for the construction of thirty-six
steel vessels trawler type with as
good speed as can be obtained on
the dimensions, and one hundred
wooden steam drifters. They will
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avail themselves of all information
as to design and cost which has
been collected by the Imperial
Munitions Board but they hope that
detailed designs and all necessary
information not procurable here will
be forwarded with the least possible
delay.”

suitable steamers from Canadian
yards which would be property of and
paid for by His Majesty’s Government
and James Esplen is being instructed
to place himself in communication
with Imperial Munitions Board and
supervise arrangements in concert
with them.

From then on, several telegrams
were sent, but in none of them was there
any hint that the Admiralty intended these
vessels were for use in the Western
Atlantic, or were to form part of the
Newfoundland and Canadian Patrol. The
following points out that the building of
ships or vessels in Canada formed part
of a general scheme to increase output,
but speaks of two programmes:-

“This programme is not concerned
with Naval construction dealt with
in my telegram February 5th above
mentioned but only with mercantile
shipping.

“London, February 12th 1917. With
reference to my telegram February
5th. There has been recently adopted
a scheme for securing as much as
possible of prospect of output of
shipbuilding yards of United States
for His Majesty’s Government. For the
purpose of supervising arrangements
John Esplen Sons and Swainson
Consulting Engineers, has been
attached to Department of Controller
of Shipping and negotiations in
America are being conducted under
his general direction by James
Esplen in conjunction with Cunard
Company. Shipping Controller is
anxious to extend scope of this
scheme to Canada for my securing
as large an output as possible of

“From international standpoint the
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
recently advised that there was no
objection to taking over ships now
building for Norwegian owners.”
The penultimate paragraph led
us to suppose that information would
be received as to the allocation of the
drifters and trawlers referred to as “Naval
construction”, but nothing was heard until
the arrival of Admiral Sir C. Coke with two
officer overseers on his staff.
Apparently before leaving England,
the Commodore was informed that
the drifters and trawlers mentioned in
telegram of the 5th February 1917, were
for operation on the Atlantic seaboard,
and his statement to that effect was
the first that was known here that these
vessels were to be utilized on these
coasts, nor have the Department yet
heard from the Admiralty direct that this
was ever their intention.
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Above right: HMCS St. Eloi, one of 12
Battle class naval trawlers ordered
by the Canadian government, was
launched on 2 August 1917 at the
Polson Iron Works in Toronto, Ontario.
The design of the ships was based on
North Sea trawlers and they were lightly
armed with a QF 12-pounder gun and
depth charges.
Below right: A row of recently launched
trawlers, including HMC Ships Festubert,
St. Eloi, St. Julien and Vimy, await to be
outfitted at the Polson Iron Works.

original thirty-six patrol vessels, and
necessitated a demand for still more
stores. He also requested that paravanes
might be ordered, and the matter was
taken up with the Admiralty. Evidently
Captain Hatcher was not very well up in
the use of paravanes for small ships, as
will be seen by the attached telegrams.
Not long after his arrival, it was
proposed to the Canadian Government to
withdraw the first fifty drifters and sixteen
trawlers completing.
This last action, taken into
consideration with all that had gone
before, decided the Minister to ask the
Admiralty opinion, through the Colonial
Office, on the following lines:1.
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What are considered the
probable chances of attack by

2.
3.

4.

submarines on the Canadian
Atlantic Coast?
On what scale?
What defence does Admiralty
recommend should be
adopted?
What does Admiralty propose
to do in the event of such an
attack developing to such
an extent as would point to
continuance of enemy attempt
to carry on submarine war on
this side of the Atlantic?

and to request some definite scheme
be given Canada to carry out, after
due consideration of the personnel and
material available.
In order that the Admiralty officials will
have someone at hand who is touch with

DND photo CN-3946

There were certain arrangements
made as to manning these drifters and
trawlers which led the Department to
suppose they were intended for other
waters and several questions as to the
disposal of the drifters asked by telegram
still remain unanswered.
In August, 1917, Commodore Sir
C. Coke, R.N.R., returned, and Acting
Captain J.O. Hatcher was proposed as
a relief, and his services were gladly
accepted on the understanding that he
would be appointed to command Patrols
if it was thought desirable, meaning by the
Department. There was apparently some
misunderstanding about this, and Captain
Hatcher was given to understand that he
had been sent to command Patrols, and
arrived to find that such appointment
had been given to Acting Captain Walter
Hose, R.C.N., which must have been a
disappointment to him, although he at
once said he was willing and anxious to
do anything.
Commodore Sir C. Coke, on arrival in
Canada, looked into the question of antisubmarine defence and demanded some
quantities of stores for mine sweeping,
depth charges, hydrophones, indicator
nets for drifters, and fittings. These
requests for stores were forwarded by
telegram to the Admiralty, from time to
time. Little progress was made as it was
found impossible to forward the stores:
moreover, strikes occurred in different
localities and no ships were ready.
Acting Captain Hatcher, on arrival,
went into the matter of anti-submarine
defence. His proposed scheme for
defence against submarines was drawn
up on the assumption that the vessels
available would number one hundred
drifters and fifty trawlers in addition to

DND photo CN-3949

DND photo CN-3200
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Top: Canadian Drifter 49. One hundred
of these 84-foot long wooden antisubmarine vessels were built at
Canadian shipyards under contract for
the British Admiralty. CD-49 arrived at
Sydney, Nova Scotia for operations in
July 1918. On her bow is a 6-pounder
quick-firing gun; the aerial for a wireless
set can be seen between her masts.
Depth charges were dropped from the
stern.
Middle: HMCS Festubert, one of 12 Battle
class naval trawlers. Commissioned in
November 1917, she was based at
Halifax for much of 1918.

DND photo CN-3398

DND photo CN-5078

Bottom: TR 8, one of the initial batch of
36 trawlers built in Canada under British
Admiralty contract and assigned to the
RCN east coast patrol. Commissioned
in late June 1918, TR 8 was fitted for
minesweeping and stationed at Halifax.
local conditions, difficulties of purchases,
etc., etc., Captain Martin, Superintendent
of Halifax Dockyard, has been sent to
London.
I would call attention to the following:The officers in command of this
vessels of the Canadian Patrol have
had, with two exceptions, no knowledge
of Naval matters prior to the outbreak of
hostilities, while there is no exception in
the case of the other officers.
With regard to the ratings, the
majority of petty officers are ex R.N.,
while the remainder are in most cases
volunteers from all ranks of life – from sea
life very few.
With this material, unless it is possible
to lend more persons competent to
instruct them in the methods in vogue
as to the use of nets, depth charges,
paravanes, etc., not very much can be
expected.
It is also requested that the
Department may be kept informed
as to the developments in the use of
hydrophones. It is regretted that we have
no spare officers to send to England to
obtain this information.
			

C E Kingsmill

			
Admiral,
		
Director of the Naval Service
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